Internet Accessible Device

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Internet Accessible Device
Technique
ID	T0883
Tactic	Initial Access
Data Sources	Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Logon Session: Logon Session Metadata
Asset	Control Server, Data Historian, Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED, Human-Machine Interface, Input/Output Server, Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay

Description

Adversaries may gain access into industrial environments through systems exposed directly to the internet for remote access rather than through External Remote Services. Internet Accessible Devices are exposed to the internet unintentionally or intentionally without adequate protections. This may allow for adversaries to move directly into the control system network. Access onto these devices is accomplished without the use of exploits, these would be represented within the Exploit Public-Facing Application technique.

Adversaries may leverage built in functions for remote access which may not be protected or utilize minimal legacy protections that may be targeted.1 These services may be discoverable through the use of online scanning tools.

In the case of the Bowman dam incident, adversaries leveraged access to the dam control network through a cellular modem. Access to the device was protected by password authentication, although the application was vulnerable to brute forcing.123

In Trend Micro’s manufacturing deception operations adversaries were detected leveraging direct internet access to an ICS environment through the exposure of operational protocols such as Siemens S7, Omron FINS, and EtherNet/IP, in addition to misconfigured VNC access.4

Mitigations

• Network Segmentation - Deny direct remote access to internal systems through the use of network proxies, gateways, and firewalls. Steps should be taken to periodically inventory internet accessible devices to determine if it differs from the expected.

References

1. a b  NCCIC. (2014, January 1). Internet Accessible Control Systems At Risk. Retrieved November 7, 2019.
2. ^  Danny Yadron. (2015, December 20). Iranian Hackers Infiltrated New York Dam in 2013. Retrieved November 7, 2019.

3. ^  Mark Thompson. (2016, March 24). Iranian Cyber Attack on New York Dam Shows Future of War. Retrieved November 7, 2019.
4. ^  Stephen Hilt, Federico Maggi, Charles Perine, Lord Remorin, Martin Rösler, and Rainer Vosseler. (n.d.). Caught in the Act: Running a Realistic Factory Honeypot to Capture Real Threats. Retrieved April 12, 2021.