External Remote Services
| External Remote Services | |
|---|---|
| Technique | |
| ID | T0822 |
| Tactic | Initial Access, Lateral Movement |
| Data Sources | Authentication logs |
| Asset | Control Server, Input/Output Server |
Description
Adversaries may leverage external remote services as a point of initial access into your network. These services allow users to connect to internal network resources from external locations. Examples are VPNs, Citrix, and other access mechanisms. Remote service gateways often manage connections and credential authentication for these services.1
External remote services allow administration of a control system from outside the system. Often, vendors and internal engineering groups have access to external remote services to control system networks via the corporate network. In some cases, this access is enabled directly from the internet. While remote access enables ease of maintenance when a control system is in a remote area, compromise of remote access solutions is a liability. The adversary may use these services to gain access to and execute attacks against a control system network. Access to valid accounts is often a requirement.
As they look for an entry point into the control system network, adversaries may begin searching for existing point‐to‐point VPN implementations at trusted third party networks or through remote support employee connections where split tunneling is enabled.2
In the Maroochy Attack, the adversary was able to gain remote computer access to the system over radio.
The 2015 attack on the Ukranian power grid showed the use of existing remote access tools within the environment to access the control system network. The adversary harvested worker credentials some of them for VPNs the grid workers used to remotely log into the control system networks.3245 The VPNs into these networks appear to have lacked two‐factor authentication.2
Procedure Examples
- XENOTIME utilized remote desktop protocol (RDP) jump boxes to move into the ICS environment.6
- Bad Rabbit can utilize exposed SMB services to access industrial networks.7
- NotPetya can utilize exposed SMB services to access industrial networks.7
- WannaCry can utilize exposed SMB services to access industrial networks.7
Mitigations
- Disable or Remove Feature or Program - Consider removal of remote services which are not regularly in use, or only enabling them when required (e.g., vendor remote access). Ensure all external remote access point (e.g., jump boxes, VPN concentrator) are configured with least functionality, especially the removal of unnecessary services.8
- Multi-factor Authentication - Use strong multi-factor authentication for remote service accounts to mitigate an adversary's ability to leverage stolen credentials. Be aware of multi-factor authentication interception techniques for some implementations.
- Network Segmentation - Deny direct remote access to internal systems through the use of network proxies, gateways, and firewalls. Consider a jump server or host into the DMZ for greater access control. Leverage this DMZ or corporate resources for vendor access.9
- User Account Management - Consider utilizing jump boxes for external remote access. Additionally, dynamic account management may be used to easily remove accounts when not in use.
- Limit Access to Resource Over Network - Limit access to remote services through centrally managed concentrators such as VPNs and other managed remote access systems.
- Account Use Policies - Configure features related to account use like login attempt lockouts, specific login times, and password strength requirements as examples. Consider these features as they relate to assets which may impact safety and availability.9
- Password Policies - Set and enforce secure password policies for accounts.
References
- ^ Daniel Oakley, Travis Smith, Tripwire. (n.d.). Retrieved May 30, 2018.
- a b c Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis Center; SANS Industrial Control Systems. (2016, March 18). Analysis of the Cyber Attack on the Ukranian Power Grid: Defense Use Case. Retrieved March 27, 2018.
- ^ Zetter, Kim. (2016, March 03). INSIDE THE CUNNING, UNPRECEDENTED HACK OF UKRAINE'S POWER GRID. Retrieved March 8, 2019.
- ^ ICS-CERT. (2016, February 25). Cyber-Attack Against Ukrainian Critical Infrastructure. Retrieved March 8, 2019.
- ^ John Hultquist. (2016, January 07). Sandworm Team and the Ukrainian Power Authority Attacks. Retrieved March 8, 2019.
- ^ Dragos. (2017, December 13). TRISIS Malware Analysis of Safety System Targeted Malware. Retrieved January 12, 2018.
- a b c Joe Slowik. (2019, April 10). Implications of IT Ransomware for ICS Environments. Retrieved October 27, 2019.
- ^ Department of Homeland Security. (2016, September). Retrieved September 25, 2020.
- a b Keith Stouffer. (2015, May). Guide to Industrial Control Systems (ICS) Security. Retrieved March 28, 2018.
