Property:Has Description

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Showing 20 pages using this property.
C
Collection consists of techniques adversaries use to gather domain knowledge and obtain contextual feedback in an ICS environment. This tactic is often performed as part of [[Discovery]], to compile data on control systems and targets of interest that may be used to follow through on the adversary’s objective. Examples of these techniques include observing operation states, capturing screenshots, identifying unique device roles, and gathering system and diagram schematics. Collection of this data can play a key role in planning, executing, and even revising an ICS-targeted attack. Methods of collection depend on the categories of data being targeted, which can include protocol specific, device specific, and process specific configurations and functionality. Information collected may pertain to a combination of system, supervisory, device, and network related data, which conceptually fall under high, medium, and low levels of plan operations. For example, information repositories on plant data at a high level or device specific programs at a low level. Sensitive floor plans, vendor device manuals, and other references may also be at risk and exposed on the internet or otherwise publicly accessible.  +
Command and Control consists of techniques that adversaries use to communicate with and send commands to compromised systems, devices, controllers, and platforms with specialized applications used in ICS environments. Examples of these specialized communication devices include human machine interfaces (HMIs), data historians, SCADA servers, and engineering workstations (EWS). Adversaries often seek to use commonly available resources and mimic expected network traffic to avoid detection and suspicion. For instance, commonly used ports and protocols in ICS environments, and even expected IT resources, depending on the target network. Command and Control may be established to varying degrees of stealth, often depending on the victim’s network structure and defenses.  +
A device which acts as both a server and controller, that hosts the control software used in communicating with lower-level control devices in an ICS network (e.g. Remote Terminal Units (RTUs) and Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs)).[[CiteRef::Guidance - NIST SP800-82]]  +
D
A centralized database located on a computer installed in the control system DMZ supporting external corporate user data access for archival and analysis using statistical process control and other techniques.[[CiteRef::References - ICS CERT definitions]]  +
Discovery consists of techniques that adversaries use to survey your ICS environment and gain knowledge about the internal network, control system devices, and how their processes interact. These techniques help adversaries observe the environment and determine next steps for target selection and [[Lateral Movement]]. They also allow adversaries to explore what they can control and gain insight on interactions between various control system processes. Discovery techniques are often an act of progression into the environment which enable the adversary to orient themselves before deciding how to act. Adversaries may use Discovery techniques that result in [[Collection]], to help determine how available resources benefit their current objective. A combination of native device communications and functions, and custom tools are often used toward this post-compromise information-gathering objective.  +
E
The engineering workstation is usually a high-end very reliable computing platform designed for configuration, maintenance and diagnostics of the control system applications and other control system equipment. The system is usually made up of redundant hard disk drives, high speed network interface, reliable CPUs, performance graphics hardware, and applications that provide configuration and monitoring tools to perform control system application development, compilation and distribution of system modifications.[[CiteRef::References - ICS CERT definitions]]  +
Evasion consists of techniques that adversaries use to avoid detection by both human operators and technical defenses throughout their compromise. Techniques used for evasion include removal of indicators of compromise, spoofing communications and reporting, and exploiting software vulnerabilities. Adversaries may also leverage and abuse trusted devices and processes to hide their activity, possibly by masquerading as master devices or native software. Methods of defense and operator evasion for this purpose are often more passive in nature, as opposed to [[Inhibit Response Function]] techniques. They may also vary depending on whether the target of evasion is human or technological in nature, such as security controls. Techniques under other tactics are cross-listed to evasion when those techniques include the added benefit of subverting operators and defenses.  +
Execution consists of techniques that result in adversary-controlled code running on a local or remote system, device, or other asset. This execution may also rely on unknowing end users or the manipulation of device operating modes to run. Adversaries may infect remote targets with programmed executables or malicious project files that operate according to specified behavior and may alter expected device behavior in subtle ways. Commands for execution may also be issued from command-line interfaces, APIs, GUIs, or other available interfaces. Techniques that run malicious code may also be paired with techniques from other tactics, particularly to aid network [[Discovery]] and [[Collection]], impact operations, and inhibit response functions.  +
F
Controller terminology depends on the type of system they are associated with. They provide typical processing capabilities. Controllers, sometimes referred to as Remote Terminal Units (RTU) and Programmable Logic Controllers (PLC), are computerized control units that are typically rack or panel mounted with modular processing and interface cards. The units are collocated with the process equipment and interface through input and output modules to the various sensors and controlled devices. Most utilize a programmable logic-based application that provides scanning and writing of data to and from the IO interface modules and communicates with the control system network via various communications methods, including serial and network communications.[[CiteRef::References - ICS CERT definitions]]  +
H
In computer science and human-computer interaction, the Human-Machine Interface (HMI) refers to the graphical, textual and auditory information the program presents to the user (operator) using computer monitors and audio subsystems, and the control sequences (such as keystrokes with the computer keyboard, movements of the computer mouse, and selections with the touchscreen) the user employs to control the program. Currently the following types of HMI are the most common: Graphical user interfaces(GUI) accept input via devices such as computer keyboard and mouse and provide articulated graphical output on the computer monitor. Web-based user interfaces accept input and provide output by generating web pages which are transported via the network and viewed by the user using a web browser program. The operations user must be able to control the system and assess the state of the system. Each control system vendor provides a unique look-and-feel to their basic HMI applications. An older, not gender-neutral version of the term is man-machine interface (MMI). The system may expose several user interfaces to serve different kinds of users. User interface screens may be optimized to provide the appropriate information and control interface to operations users, engineering users and management users.[[CiteRef::References - ICS CERT definitions]]  +
I
Impact consists of techniques that adversaries use to disrupt, compromise, destroy, and manipulate the integrity and availability of control system operations, processes, devices, and data. These techniques encompass the influence and effects resulting from adversarial efforts to attack the ICS environment or that tangentially impact it. Impact techniques can result in more instantaneous disruption to control processes and the operator, or may result in more long term damage or loss to the ICS environment and related operations. The adversary may leverage [[Impair Process Control]] techniques, which often manifest in more self-revealing impacts on operations, or [[Inhibit Response Function]] techniques to hinder safeguards and alarms in order to follow through with and provide cover for Impact. In some scenarios, control system processes can appear to function as expected, but may have been altered to benefit the adversary’s goal over the course of a longer duration. These techniques might be used by adversaries to follow through on their end goal or to provide cover for a confidentiality breach. , , and <span class="smw-format list-format "><span class="smw-row"><span class="smw-field"><span class="smw-value">[[Technique/T0879|Damage to Property]]</span></span></span></span> are meant to encompass some of the more granular goals of adversaries in targeted and untargeted attacks. These techniques in and of themselves are not necessarily detectable, but the associated adversary behavior can potentially be mitigated and/or detected.  +
Impair Process Control consists of techniques that adversaries use to disrupt control logic and cause determinantal effects to processes being controlled in the target environment. Targets of interest may include active procedures or parameters that manipulate the physical environment. These techniques can also include prevention or manipulation of reporting elements and control logic. If an adversary has modified process functionality, then they may also obfuscate the results, which are often self-revealing in their impact on the outcome of a product or the environment. The direct physical control these techniques exert may also threaten the safety of operators and downstream users, which can prompt response mechanisms. Adversaries may follow up with or use [[Inhibit Response Function]] techniques in tandem, to assist with the successful abuse of control processes to result in [[Impact]].  +
Inhibit Response Function consists of techniques that adversaries use to hinder the safeguards put in place for processes and products. This may involve the inhibition of safety, protection, quality assurance, or operator intervention functions to disrupt safeguards that aim to prevent the loss of life, destruction of equipment, and disruption of production. These techniques aim to actively deter and prevent expected alarms and responses that arise due to statuses in the ICS environment. Adversaries may modify or update system logic, or even outright prevent responses with a denial-of-service. They may result in the prevention, destruction, manipulation, or modification of programs, logic, devices, and communications. As prevention functions are generally dormant, reporting and processing functions can appear fine, but may have been altered to prevent failure responses in dangerous scenarios. Unlike [[Evasion]], Inhibit Response Function techniques may be more intrusive, such as actively preventing responses to a known dangerous scenario. Adversaries may use these techniques to follow through with or provide cover for [[Impact]] techniques.  +
Initial Access consists of techniques that adversaries may use as entry vectors to gain an initial foothold within an ICS environment. These techniques include compromising operational technology assets, IT resources in the OT network, and external remote services and websites. They may also target third party entities and users with privileged access. In particular, these initial access footholds may include devices and communication mechanisms with access to and privileges in both the IT and OT environments. IT resources in the OT environment are also potentially vulnerable to the same attacks as enterprise IT systems. Trusted third parties of concern may include vendors, maintenance personnel, engineers, external integrators, and other outside entities involved in expected ICS operations. Vendor maintained assets may include physical devices, software, and operational equipment. Initial access techniques may also leverage outside devices, such as radios, controllers, or removable media, to remotely interfere with and possibly infect OT operations.  +
The Input/Output (I/O) server provides the interface between the control system LAN applications and the field equipment monitored and controlled by the control system applications. The I/O server, sometimes referred to as a Front-End Processor (FEP) or Data Acquisition Server (DAS), converts the control system application data into packets that are transmitted over various types of communications media to the end device locations. The I/O server also converts data received from the various end devices over different communications mediums into data formatted to communicate with the control system networked applications.[[CiteRef::References - ICS CERT definitions]]  +
L
Lateral Movement consists of techniques that adversaries use to enter and control remote systems on a network. These techniques abuse default credentials, known accounts, and vulnerable services, and may also leverage dual-homed devices and systems that reside on both the IT and OT networks. The adversary uses these techniques to pivot to their next point in the environment, positioning themselves to where they want to be or think they should be. Following through on their primary objective often requires [[Discovery]] of the network and [[Collection]] to develop awareness of unique ICS devices and processes, in order to find their target and subsequently gain access to it. Reaching this objective often involves pivoting through multiple systems, devices, and accounts. Adversaries may install their own remote tools to accomplish Lateral Movement or leverage default tools, programs, and manufacturer set or other legitimate credentials native to the network, which may be stealthier.  +
The I/O network level includes the actual physical processes and sensors and actuators that are directly connected to process equipment.  +
The control network level includes the functions involved in sensing and manipulating physical processes. Typical devices at this level are programmable logic controllers (PLCs), distributed control systems, safety instrumented systems and remote terminal units (RTUs).  +
The supervisory control LAN level includes the functions involved in monitoring and controlling physical processes and the general deployment of systems such as human-machine interfaces (HMIs), engineering workstations and historians.  +
P
Persistence consists of techniques that adversaries use to maintain access to ICS systems and devices across restarts, changed credentials, and other interruptions that could cut off their access. Techniques used for persistence include any access, action, or configuration changes that allow them to secure their ongoing activity and keep their foothold on systems. This may include replacing or hijacking legitimate code, firmware, and other project files, or adding startup code and downloading programs onto devices.  +